Evaluation of detection elements for the implementation of the performance requirements of DOE Order 5633. 3 (Materials Control and Accountability)
Conference
·
OSTI ID:6632082
- Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (USA)
- USDOE Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, Washington, DC (USA). Office of Safeguards and Security
The performance requirements of DOE Order 5633.3 (Materials Control and Accountability) specify that facilities which have custody of special nuclear material (SNM) should demonstrate that their protective systems achieve a designated level of performance in detecting the theft or diversion of SNM. The performance levels are defined in terms of a detection probability, a goal quantity of material, and a time to detection, depending upon the category and attractiveness of the material. In a typical facility there are approximately 25 individual elements of the system which contribute detection capability; the methods of vulnerability assessment are employed to combine the detection probabilities of those elements which enter into a given removal scenario to obtain an overall detection probability for the scenario. The central problem in this process is the quantitative determination of a valid detection probability for each element of the system for all relevant conditions. This requires the thorough evaluation of both the physical and procedural attributes of each element. In addition, strategies available to the adversary for the defeat of a given element must be considered. The combined metal detector -- SNM portal monitor element is discussed as an example of the evaluation process. 7 refs., 1 fig.
- Research Organization:
- Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (USA)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/ER
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC02-76CH00016
- OSTI ID:
- 6632082
- Report Number(s):
- BNL-44962; CONF-9007106--60; ON: DE90016312
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
055000* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACCOUNTABILITY
ALARM SYSTEMS
DETECTION
EVALUATION
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
MANAGEMENT
MEASURING INSTRUMENTS
MONITORS
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PERFORMANCE
SAFEGUARDS
SECURITY
US DOE
US ORGANIZATIONS
Inspection
& Accountability
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACCOUNTABILITY
ALARM SYSTEMS
DETECTION
EVALUATION
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
MANAGEMENT
MEASURING INSTRUMENTS
MONITORS
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PERFORMANCE
SAFEGUARDS
SECURITY
US DOE
US ORGANIZATIONS