A new insider vulnerability assessment model
A new insider vulnerability assessment model is currently being developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The model focuses on timely detection of theft or diversion of nuclear material by a non-violent insider. This model will be part of an integrated vulnerability assessment package being developed jointly by LLNL and Sandia National Laboratory. The model will enable a safeguards analyst to complete a comprehensive and well-documented vulnerability analysis. Two major components are used in the model. The first consists of a description of the facility being analyzed, the safeguards components in use at the facility, the theft material, and the potential insider adversaries. The second component is a predefined set of strategy definitions, including specific methods of defeating the individual safeguards components. It also contains the logic and equations necessary to determine which strategies apply to the various insider adversaries and to compute the associated detection probabilities. The optimal theft scenario and the overall probability of detection are determined for each type leads to consistency of results and ease of evaluation. The reports generated are designed to aid in identifying weaknesses and suggesting potential upgrades. Re-evaluation is simplified by the structure of the model. 1 ref., 5 figs.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 6914964
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-98142; CONF-880631-31; ON: DE88014146
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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