Calculation of parameters for inspection planning and evaluation: low enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities

Technical Report · Sun Feb 01 04:00:00 EST 1981

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/6603191· OSTI ID:6603191

Reardon, P T; Mullen, M F; Harms, N L

As part of Task C.35 (Calculation of Parameters for Inspection Planning and Evaluation) of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, Pacific Northwest Laboratory has performed some quantitative analyses of IAEA inspection activities at low-enriched uranium (LEU) conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. This report presents the results and conclusions of those analyses. Implementation of IAEA safeguards at LEU conversion and fuel fabrication facilities must take into account a variety of practical problems and constraints. One of the key concerns is the problem of flow verification, especially product verification. The objective of this report is to help put the problem of flow verification in perspective by presenting the results of some specific calculations of inspection effort and probability of detection for various product measurement strategies. In order to provide quantitative information about the advantages and disadvantages of the various strategies, eight specific cases were examined.

• Research Organization: Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs., Richland, WA (USA)
• DOE Contract Number: AC06-76RL01830
• OSTI ID: 6603191
• Report Number(s): PNL-3712; ISPO-140
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055001* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACTINIDES
DETECTION
ELEMENTS
ENRICHED URANIUM
EVALUATION
FEED MATERIALS PLANTS
FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
INDUSTRIAL PLANTS
INSPECTION
INVENTORIES
ISOTOPE ENRICHED MATERIALS
MANAGEMENT
MATERIALS
METALS
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
SAFEGUARDS
SLIGHTLY ENRICHED URANIUM
URANIUM