skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: Competition and liberalization in European gas markets: Towards a continental European model

Abstract

Many of the long-awaited changes to the European gas market are now imminent. Institutional developments and market forces are combining to produce a transformation. This major study analyzes the developments in a wide range of European countries, including central and eastern Europe. In examining how different institutional traditions and political priorities will affect the gas market, Stern explores the potential for a distinct continental European model of competition and liberalization.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Royal Inst. of International Affairs, London (United Kingdom); Brookings Institution, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
649544
Report Number(s):
BROOK-0348/XAB
ISBN 1-86203-017-0; TRN: 82431695
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: Jun 1998
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
29 ENERGY PLANNING AND POLICY; ENERGY POLICY; COMPETITION; MARKET; EUROPE; GOVERNMENT POLICIES; NATURAL GAS; ENERGY MODELS; INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS; POLITICAL ASPECTS

Citation Formats

Stern, J.P.. Competition and liberalization in European gas markets: Towards a continental European model. United States: N. p., 1998. Web.
Stern, J.P.. Competition and liberalization in European gas markets: Towards a continental European model. United States.
Stern, J.P.. 1998. "Competition and liberalization in European gas markets: Towards a continental European model". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_649544,
title = {Competition and liberalization in European gas markets: Towards a continental European model},
author = {Stern, J.P.},
abstractNote = {Many of the long-awaited changes to the European gas market are now imminent. Institutional developments and market forces are combining to produce a transformation. This major study analyzes the developments in a wide range of European countries, including central and eastern Europe. In examining how different institutional traditions and political priorities will affect the gas market, Stern explores the potential for a distinct continental European model of competition and liberalization.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 1998,
month = 6
}

Technical Report:
Other availability
Please see Document Availability for additional information on obtaining the full-text document. Library patrons may search WorldCat to identify libraries that may hold this item. Keep in mind that many technical reports are not cataloged in WorldCat.

Save / Share:
  • Energy Policy Act of 1992 presumes that each wholesale market for electric power is competitive or nearly so, although each of the associated transmission and distribution markets do not met the competitive standard at the present time. Two regulatory problems have to be solved when it is necessary to mix competitive and noncompetitive markets to produce regulated services: regulators have to oversee the noncompetitive markets effectively, and they have to avoid the opportunistic bypass of regulated services. This research examines whether price-cap regulation of the transmission market is the solution to the first problem, and whether the efficient component pricingmore » of unbundled transmission services is the solution to the second problem. It is determined that under certain conditions, rate-of-return regulation of transmission services is superior to price-cap regulation.« less
  • This document summarizes the major points made by speakers and participants in a GRI-sponsored energy seminar on the U.S. industrial sector. The first session presented GRI's analytical overview of the industrial sector and GRI's Industrial Utilization RandD Program Strategy that addresses the needs of the traditional heavy-gas-using industries. It also focused on the current position of gas in its traditional markets and the issues/technologies that will affect the future of gas in these markets from the perspective of a major industrial user (steel), a gas distributor, and an equipment manufacturer. The second session presented GRI's analytical perspective on the rangemore » of opportunities/challenges presented by new applications for gas technology in the industrial sector and the ongoing and planned RandD in GRI's efforts to find new markets for gas. Also presented were research efforts at Garrett AiResearch in the area of heat and cogeneration, and gas technology advances and future research needs in Great Britain.« less
  • This study evaluates the combined effects of major legal and regulatory actions on competition in the domestic oil production and refining sectors. The historical periods before and after the oil embargo of 1973 are examined to determine the impact of the total regulatory framework first, on the process of competition, and second, on major classes of competitors. It is concluded that the combination of laws and regulations which were established after the Arab oil embargo had little impact on eliminating competition in oil production and refining. Impediments to competition that existed in these industries prior to the embargo were largelymore » unchanged under the post-embargo generation of regulations.« less
  • Technological changes and PURPA significantly impacted retail competition in generation. As a result, pricing for standby services in retail markets has fluctuated and evolved significantly. This includes a significant element of learning from mistakes that are now beginning to be discovered. FERC`s Open Access NOPR is expected to have similar impacts for wholesale competition, in generation, and over the long-term, in transmission. That is, standby services pricing in the wholesale markets could become increasingly important. The changes, mistakes, and evolution of pricing of retail standby services can be used to anticipate the pricing issues for standby services in the newermore » more competitive wholesale and retail power markets of the future. This paper presents an overview of the issues that utilities should address when pricing standby services. The material for this paper is based upon work Dr. Megdal performed for the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and supervised by Mr. Eric Ackerman. Dr. Megdal developed an issue paper for EEI concerning using retail and state experiences with standby service pricing to understand potential issues on the wholesale level. These are being examined from the perspective of potential market changes to be expected from the FERC Open-Access rulemaking.« less
  • A common approach to regulating electricity is through auction-based competitive wholesale markets. The goal of this approach is to provide a reliable supply of power at the lowest reasonable cost to the consumer. This necessitates market structures and operating rules that ensure revenue sufficiency for all generators needed for resource adequacy purposes. Wholesale electricity markets employ marginal-cost pricing to provide cost-effective dispatch such that resources are compensated for their operational costs. However, marginal-cost pricing alone cannot guarantee cost recovery outside of perfect competition, and electricity markets have at least six attributes that preclude them from functioning as perfectly competitive markets.more » These attributes include market power, externalities, public good attributes, lack of storage, wholesale price caps, and ineffective demand curve. Until (and unless) these failures are ameliorated, some form of corrective action(s) will be necessary to improve market efficiency so that prices can correctly reflect the needed level of system reliability. Many of these options necessarily involve some form of administrative or out-of-market actions, such as scarcity pricing, capacity payments, bilateral or other out-of-market contracts, or some hybrid combination. A key focus with these options is to create a connection between the electricity market and long-term reliability/loss-of-load expectation targets, which are inherently disconnected in the native markets because of the aforementioned market failures. The addition of variable generation resources can exacerbate revenue sufficiency and resource adequacy concerns caused by these underlying market failures. Because variable generation resources have near-zero marginal costs, they effectively suppress energy prices and reduce the capacity factors of conventional generators through the merit-order effect in the simplest case of a convex market; non-convexities can also suppress prices.« less