Nuclear weapons, irrational behavior, and extended deterrence
This dissertation examines the problem of extended deterrence deductively develops a theory of commitment-through-contingent irrationality, and draws upon this theory to frame a set of comparatively attractive policy recommendations. To these ends, the dissertation explores the nature, sources, and types of irrationality and irrational behavior, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of coercive power, the various logical modes of commitment, and the various modes of nuclear coercion. These strands are fused into a theory of nuclear coercion based on contingently irrational behavior that has relevance for the problem of extended deterrence and that has important implications for US policy.
- Research Organization:
- Princeton Univ., NJ (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 6453243
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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