Conventional deterrence and strategic change
This thesis argues that deterrence based on conventional weapons is prone to failure. The unique characteristics associated with nuclear weapons, however, tend to provide for a robust deterrent. This argument is supported by four case studies (Berlin 1958, 1961; Taiwan Straits, 1954-55; Western Front, 1939; Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1973). The general conclusion of the thesis departs from the current deterrence literature in three respects. First, this study disagrees with the view that argues that conventional deterrence may be obtained under certain circumstances. Instead, it argues that conventional deterrents can always be undermined by opposing weapons, tactics, and strategies. Second, the literature critical of deterrence theory has argued that it is wrong to assume that decision makers will always behave rationally. This thesis accepts the possibility of motivational biases, errors of simplification, and organizational dysfunction impinging on decision-making, but argues that the potential for irrational behavior supports deterrent threats to use nuclear weapons. Finally, the policy implications of this thesis disagree with the prevailing view of placing less reliance on nuclear weapons.
- Research Organization:
- Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore, MD (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 5704627
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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