Crisis stability during a transition to a deterrence posture reliant on defenses
Technical Report
·
OSTI ID:6422800
Issues about the crisis stability during the transition from the present offensive weapon dominated world to one where deterrence is based on competent defenses are discussed. A simple model of a nuclear exchange is introduced and used to highlight the importance making offensive forces survivable before the deployment of wide area defenses. A simple rule is suggested how to build-up area defenses so as to prevent dominance by either side and incentives to strike first in the event of the crisis. 1 ref., 12 figs.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 6422800
- Report Number(s):
- UCID-20590; ON: DE86003904
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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