Strategic and political implications of strategic defense systems development
The international system is in a process of transition. A mathematical model based on the concept of entropy suggests that the emerging system might be less stable than the former one. It is expected that an increased number of countries will have nuclear capabilities and adequate means of delivery. A reasonable level of military power must be maintained to protect national interests. The significant changes taking place in the world require a reexamination of the role of the vulnerability based deterrence in preventing a nuclear war. This reexamination is done by developing a set of functions (curves) for analyzing the utility of the first nuclear strike and the disutility of the corresponding counterstrike. The conclusion is that internal causes and structural systemic factors will limit the role of vulnerability based deterrence in the emerging international system. To compensate for an even limited failure of MAD, confidence building measures and/or disarmament agreements should be associated with the development and future deployment of strategic defensive systems. The SDI debate and some recent technological achievements suggest that the defense against ballistic missiles, conceived in rational and realistic terms, might be an attainable objective. The necessity of strategic defense is supported by two sets of dynamical models. The first shows that a strategic offensive weapons arms race is unstable and indicates how the arms race's spiral occurs. The development and future deployment of strategic defensive systems might be a means to control and scale down the strategic offensive arms race. The second set includes three optimal control models. They may be used for studying the relationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive systems, and for deriving potentially optimal policies. The computer programs written for the models allow efficient simulation of various scenarios.
- Research Organization:
- City Univ. of New York, NY (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 7114975
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: Thesis (Ph.D.)
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
29 ENERGY PLANNING
POLICY AND ECONOMY
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
MILITARY STRATEGY
POLITICAL ASPECTS
PROLIFERATION
COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION
FORECASTING
NATIONAL DEFENSE
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INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
SIMULATION
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