Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 1. Main report
Strategic analysis (game theory) is a formal method for modeling adversary situations that, when solved, yields an optimal strategy that maximizes the expected payoff to the player. As such, it appears to be potentially applicable in the nuclear material accounting context in which there is potential for an adversary attempting to divert special nuclear material. The NRC has previously supported research to develop preliminary strategic analysis models which has been considered to be only partially successful. This study reviewed previous efforts and other game theory research and assessed the feasibility of: (1) applying strategic analysis in a regulatory framework; (2) making strategic analysis understandable by licensees; and (3) assuring that strategic analysis can effectively be enforced. This report includes a discussion of the role of strategic analysis in material control and accounting, and of the mechanisms by which the NRC could implement strategic analysis. A set of feasibility criteria are described including both technical feasibility and organizational/implementation feasibility. Alternative strategic analysis model options are evaluated with respect to these criteria, as is the current material accounting practice. The assessment determined that the development of a payoff function that adequately represented the NRC's (and therefore the public's) values with respect to the consequences of diversion and the actions taken to prevent it is the most serious impediment to implementation. Given the limited role of material accounting in safeguards and the uncertainty regarding the development of a payoff function, the NRC should not proceed with full-scale implementation of strategic analysis. It does, however, have sufficient potential to warrant further development, with first priority going to the development of an appropriate payoff function.
- Research Organization:
- MAXIMA Corp., Bethesda, MD (USA); International Energy Associates Ltd., Washington, DC (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 6385274
- Report Number(s):
- NUREG/CR-3926-Vol.1; ON: TI85901089
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
GAME THEORY
SAFEGUARDS
ACCOUNTING
ADVERSARIES
FEASIBILITY STUDIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
MANAGEMENT
MATHEMATICS
STATISTICS
055001* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability- Technical Aspects