Detection probabilities in fuel cycle oriented safeguards

Conference · Thu Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1987 · Transactions of the American Nuclear Society; (USA)

OSTI ID:5534137

Canty, J J; Stein, G; Avenhaus, R ^[1]

---

1. Univ. der Bundeswehr (Germany, F.R.)

An intensified discussion of evaluation criteria for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards effectiveness is currently under way. Considerations basic to the establishment of such criteria are derived from the model agreement INFCIRC/153 and include threshold amounts, strategic significance, conversion times, required assurances, cost-effectiveness, and nonintrusiveness. In addition to these aspects, the extent to which fuel cycle characteristics are taken into account in safeguards implementations (Article 81c of INFCIRC/153) will be reflected in the criteria. The effectiveness of safeguards implemented under given manpower constraints is evaluated. As the significant quantity and timeliness criteria have established themselves within the safeguards community, these are taken as fixed. Detection probabilities, on the other hand, still provide a certain degree of freedom in interpretation. The problem of randomization of inspection activities across a fuel cycle, or portions thereof, is formalized as a two-person zero-sum game, the payoff function of which is the detection probability achieved by the inspectorate. It is argued, from the point of view of risk of detection, that fuel cycle-independent, minimally accepted threshold criteria for such detection probabilities cannot and should not be applied.

• OSTI ID: 5534137
• Report Number(s): CONF-871110--
• Conference Information: Journal Name: Transactions of the American Nuclear Society; (USA) Journal Volume: 55
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055001* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
AVAILABILITY
DETECTION
ECONOMICS
FUEL CYCLE
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
MATERIAL BALANCE AREA
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
PROBABILITY
SAFEGUARDS