Skip to main content
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Controlling industrial pollution: the economics and politics of clean air

Book ·
OSTI ID:6355837
When Congress enacted the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act, it instructed the Environmental Protection Agency to impose strict controls on ''stationary sources'' of air pollution such as factories and power plants to go along-side the controls on ''mobile sources'' such as vehicles. Crandall says there ''is some evidence that emissions from automobiles have been reduced by federal new-car standards'' - although at an unnecessarily high cost - ''but no conclusive studies demonstrate similar success for federal stationary-source policies''. The major evidence for the success of the latter standards consists of data on the concentrations of pollutants detected at various monitoring sites around the country. These data show a substantial drop in SO/sub 2/ and CO levels since the early 1970s, along with no improvement in the level of airborne particles and a rise for NO/sub x/. Unfortunately, the quality control of the monitoring is poor. EPA's data on air quality also do not correspond well with two other sets of government statistics, Crandall says. The discrepancies suggest problems with either EPA's assumptions about compliance with its emissions standards or its procedures for monitoring air quality, or both. Part of the agency's problem is that its regulations do not foster the most-efficient means of pollution abatement. Crandall considers emissions fees a more-promising way to control many types of pollution. This approach, however, would tend to redistribute wealth drastically, which makes it politically unpopular in many quarters. He offers a ''two-part'' fee scheme designed to reduce that problem. Of course, the author concludes, no incentives system can work very well if EPA lacks the capacity to monitor its enforcement.
OSTI ID:
6355837
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English