Retail competition in the electric-utility industry

Journal Article · Fri Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1982 · Denver Law J.; (United States)

OSTI ID:6166609

Hjelmfelt, D C

Regulation discourages competition between electric utilities that would lead to the duplication of distribution facilities or overlapping service territories. Fringe-area restraints can take the form of municipal franchise, state law, or some other form of agreement. Economists who believe that competition improves efficiency argue that regulation is inadequate as a substitute for competition and that natural monopoly theories are not always applied appropriately. Case studies confirm that the traditional assumptions are not compatible with the fact that competition between publicly-owned and investor-owned utilities has led to lower prices and increased sales. 1 figure. (DCK)

• OSTI ID: 6166609
• Journal Information: Denver Law J.; (United States), Journal Name: Denver Law J.; (United States) Vol. 60:1; ISSN DLJOD
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
296000* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Electric Power
32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATION
320603 -- Energy Conservation
Consumption
& Utilization-- Municipalities & Community Systems-- Public Utilities-- (1980-)
COMMERCIAL SECTOR
COMPETITION
ELECTRIC UTILITIES
MARKETERS
MONOPOLIES
PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATIONS
RETAILERS