Demand for state regulation of the electric utility industry

Journal Article · Sun Oct 01 04:00:00 EDT 1978 · J. Law Econ.; (United States)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1086/466921· OSTI ID:6219680

Jarrell, G A

The theory that the public interest is best served by state regulation of electric utilities is examined by studying its effect on electricity charges and utility profits and by comparing it with the opposing theory that regulation replaces public for private monopoly. Empirical evidence is presented to show that early state regulation favored the producer in that states having competitive electric power markets were the first to be regulated and that prices and profits began rising after state regulation began. Arguments favoring the pro-producer interpretation cite the political power of utilities relative to consumers and the liberal granting of franchises to promote competition, which can also be intrepreted as a proconsumer policy. The shift from municipal to state regulation, however, is demonstrated to have been beneficial to utility interests.

• Research Organization: Univ. of Rochester, NY
• OSTI ID: 6219680
• Journal Information: J. Law Econ.; (United States), Journal Name: J. Law Econ.; (United States) Vol. 21:2; ISSN JLLEA
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
293000* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Policy
Legislation
& Regulation
296000 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Electric Power
CHARGES
COMPETITION
ECONOMETRICS
ECONOMICS
ELECTRIC UTILITIES
MARKET
MONOPOLIES
PROFITS
PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATIONS
STATE GOVERNMENT