Nuclear weapons decision-making; an application of organization theory to the mini-nuke case
This dissertation addresses the problem of constructing and developing normative theory responsive to the need for improving the quality of decision-making in the nuclear weapons policy-making. Against the background of a critical evaluation of various paradigms in the literature (systems analysis and opposed-systems designed, the bureaucratic politics model, and the cybernetic theory of decision) an attempt is made to design an alternative analytic framework based on the writings of numerous organization theorists such as Herbert Simon and Kenneth Arrow. The framework is applied to the case of mini-nukes, i.e., proposals in the mid-1970s to develop and deploy tens of thousands of very low-yield (sub-kiloton), miniaturized fission weapons in NATO. Heuristic case study identifies the type of study undertaken in the dissertation in contrast to the more familiar paradigmatic studies identified, for example, with the Harvard Weapons Project. Application of the analytic framework developed in the dissertation of the mini-nuke case resulted in an empirical understanding of why decision making concerning tactical nuclear weapons has been such a complex task and why force modernization issues in particular have been so controversial and lacking in policy resolution.
- Research Organization:
- Stanford Univ., CA (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 6073610
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MANAGEMENT
NATO
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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WEAPONS