Some technical considerations in amending the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
One of the options currently under study for improving the survivability of the US ICBMs is the use of ballistic missile defense (BMD). Deployment, and probably development, of an effective US BMD would require Soviet consent to amendment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, (ABMT) or US withdrawal from the treaty. Purpose of this paper is to examine some of the technical questions that would arise in formulating a US position for negotiations and in the negotiations themselves. The first subjects to be analyzed are the incentives each side might have to agree to an amendment to the ABMT to allow US, and possibly Soviet, deployment of BMD of ICBM fields and the possible negotiation objectives of both parties. The results of the analysis are strongly dependent upon the postulated effectiveness of ICBMs and of BMD systems. There are significant uncertainties in predicting the effectiveness of both weapons. The second part of the paper is an analysis of how these uncertainties might affect the conclusions reached earlier. The paper concludes with some recommendations on how the analyses presented in both parts of the paper could be refined and extended.
- Research Organization:
- BDM Corp., Albuquerque, NM (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 5813125
- Report Number(s):
- BDM/A-82-137-TR; ON: TI86901452
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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