Great strategic debate: treaty compliance

Journal Article · · Foreign Policy; (United States)

OSTI ID:5803572

Einhorn, R J

Deep-seated distrust undermines the usefulness of arms control agreements and makes it essential to back up such agreements with verification and compliance measures. Issues arising from the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I of 1972, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974, and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1980 illustrate the problems of monitoring compliance as well as the fact that no significant advantages were gained by cheating. Sound, cooperative agreements that promote public confidence must minimize uncertainties in monitoring and interpreting observed behavior and should reduce the potential for disputes over violations. Compliance diplomacy based on consensus should emphasize maintaining confidentiality, raising issues routinely, using productive channels, seeking practical solutions, and offering a mix of incentives for cooperation. The administration's plan to emphasize verification and compliance will fail unless both sides value arms control. (DCK)

• Research Organization: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC
• OSTI ID: 5803572
• Journal Information: Foreign Policy; (United States), Journal Name: Foreign Policy; (United States) Vol. 45; ISSN FRPLA
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290600 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
450202* -- Explosions & Explosives-- Nuclear-- Weaponry-- (-1989)
AGREEMENTS
COMPLIANCE
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
NORTH AMERICA
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PUBLIC OPINION
USA
WEAPONS