Taking the sting out of the nuclear threat
A policy of incentives to discourage the first use of nuclear weapons can help to reduce the threat of nuclear war, but the author takes issue with the logic of those who propose requiring a conventional buildup in Europe as a condition for a no-first-use policy because it would be costly and could still lead to an escalation to nuclear war. Inherent questions about deterrence and alliance reflect the cost of pursuing invulnerability and maintaining crisis stability. Since unnecessary and tempting targets encourage first use, the author feels that the US should design a foreign policy of war avoidance and self-reliance that accommodates both short-run utilitarian action and long-term ethical principles, both of which are necessary to relieve tensions. (DCK)
- Research Organization:
- Georgetown Univ., Washington, DC
- OSTI ID:
- 5657146
- Journal Information:
- Inquiry Mag.; (United States), Vol. 6:11
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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