Political utility of nuclear weapons: The 1983 Middle East crisis
According to Western theories of nuclear deterrence, theories upon which we have staked our survival, a balance of strategic capabilities should have inclined both the US and USSR to avoid any move that might have precipitated escalation and led to a greater risk of confrontation and nuclear war. In short, the balance of strategic nuclear forces should have led to stable political relations. This did not prove to be the case, however; in October 1973 both the United States and the Soviet Union took military steps in the Middle East of some significance. Moreover, for the first time since the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, US policymakers perceived a need to manipulate the risk of nuclear war overtly with the objective of influencing Soviet behavior. Why was this done. What was expected to be accomplished. And how. To answer these questions, the authors interviewed several of the five principal participants in the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) - the forum for crisis management during the Nixon Administration - and additional members of their senior staffs. They feel that these interviews, and supplementary material found in published sources, can make an important contribution to the current debate on the utility of nuclear weapons in the conduct of American foreign policy. No direct quotations from any of the WSAG are included here, since this was precluded by the ground rules.
- OSTI ID:
- 5974012
- Journal Information:
- Int. Secur.; (United States), Vol. 7:1
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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