Verifying the Chemical Weapons Convention: the case for a United Nations verification agency. Master's thesis
To successfully conclude a Chemical Weapons Convention, it is essential to establish a permanent United Nations verification agency. While the United States currently opposes a United Nations role in multilateral arms control verification, successes by the International Atomic Energy Agency in controlling nuclear weapons and the UN Special Commission in the disarmament of Iraq demonstrate a need for the United States to revise its position on this vital matter. Potential benefits of a permanent verification agency presented in this thesis center on the need for sharing heavy CWC verification costs, the unique challenges in monitoring multinational treaties, and the advantages of an in-place body to address difficult verification concerns prior to treaty implementation. Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention will require tremendous financial resources and enhance the need for organizational efficiency and economy. A permanent UN verification agency could provide the forum for coordinating verification resources and advancing new proposals in arms control verification.
- Research Organization:
- Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 5550824
- Report Number(s):
- AD-A-245279/5/XAB
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ARMS CONTROL
ASIA
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
COST
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
EFFICIENCY
ENERGY
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
IRAQ
MIDDLE EAST
MONITORING
NORTH AMERICA
NUCLEAR ENERGY
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION
RESOURCES
TREATIES
UNITED NATIONS
USA
VERIFICATION
WEAPONS