A conceptual framework for verifying the multinational Chemical Weapons Convention
The United States has for several years sought an effective, global ban on the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons (CW). In 1984, then-Vice President Bush submitted to the ongoing Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft comprehensive Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); since then, he has supported the multinational process for CWC implementation. Given the high visibility of a CW treaty, policy makers face some major questions. Is such a treaty more valuable to national security than a chemical deterrent capability How useful will the treaty be if key nations or geographical regions are not covered How useful will the treaty be if key nations or geographical regions are not covered What constitutes an effective CWC verification regime, and can the objectives of this regime be achieved How would signatories respond to noncompliance by other signatories The answers to such questions will be important in determining the level of support, both nationally and internationally, for the multinational CWC. In addressing the issue of effective verification, it is important to consider how the CWC objectives devolve into general requirements for the verification regime. Translating these requirements into specific monitoring and inspection activities helps in understanding the extent and limitations of effective CWC verification. 4 refs.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Lab., NM (USA)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/DP
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-36
- OSTI ID:
- 6668048
- Report Number(s):
- LA-11911-MS; ON: DE90016657
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Criteria for monitoring a chemical arms treaty: Implications for the verification regime
Chemical weapons convention: Will it assure the end of chemical warfare. Study project report
Related Subjects
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
450600 -- Military Technology
Weaponry
& National Defense-- Chemical & Biological-- (1990)
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ARMS CONTROL
ASIA
CHEMICAL WARFARE
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
COMPLIANCE
COOPERATION
DETECTION
EASTERN EUROPE
EUROPE
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
IMPLEMENTATION
INSPECTION
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
MONITORING
NORTH AMERICA
PROBABILITY
STANDARDS
SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
TREATIES
USA
USSR
VERIFICATION
VIOLATIONS
WARFARE
WEAPONS