Command and control vulnerability in prolonged nuclear conflict
This study investigates the problem of command and control system survivability during prolonged nuclear conflict. Without a command system that can survive for the duration of a nuclear conflict, the American threat to prolong a nuclear war would not be credible. It is argued that, while difficult, a command and control system can be designed to survive a prolonged nuclear war. Soviet strategists believe that if a nuclear war must be fought, a short, decisive - though selectively violent - campaign offers the greatest opportunity for political victory. Many American strategists believe that the ability to prolong a nuclear war, by definition, denies the Soviets a quick victory. Thus, prolonged nuclear war capabilities would deter the Soviets because they would not be willing to risk the questionable outcome of a long war. This study argues that prolonged nuclear war theory can significantly enhance deterrence because Societ planners fear the random and unexpected. They recognize that they cannot plan for the infinite variables of a prolonged nuclear war. It is not clear that the implications of this new approach are entirely appreciated. If properly presented to the Soviets, this theory can brilliantly capitalize on the concept of uncertainty.
- OSTI ID:
- 5532444
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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