Nuclear strategy and world order: the United States imperative

Book · Fri Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1982

OSTI ID:5489835

Beres, L R

US nuclear strategy, designed initially to deter war, has undergone changes that may have the opposite effect because it presents the US as seeking a first-strike capability. This paper examines five assumptions behind selective use of nuclear forces rather than large-scale countervalue attacks. These unwarranted assumptions include the notion: (1) that the Soviet Union might decide to launch a limited first strike on the US or its allies; (2) that the Soviet Union is more likely to be deterred by the threat of limited American counterforce reprisals than by the threat of total nuclear retaliation; (3) that victory is possible in a superpower nuclear war; (4) that a counterforce nuclear strategy can be undertaken without compromising the prospects for vertical and horizontal arms control; and (5) that nuclear deterrence can work forever. 97 references.

• OSTI ID: 5489835
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290600* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy
ASIA
EASTERN EUROPE
EUROPE
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
NATIONAL SECURITY
NORTH AMERICA
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SECURITY
USA
USSR
WARFARE
WEAPONS