Nuclear strategy and world order: the United States imperative
US nuclear strategy, designed initially to deter war, has undergone changes that may have the opposite effect because it presents the US as seeking a first-strike capability. This paper examines five assumptions behind selective use of nuclear forces rather than large-scale countervalue attacks. These unwarranted assumptions include the notion: (1) that the Soviet Union might decide to launch a limited first strike on the US or its allies; (2) that the Soviet Union is more likely to be deterred by the threat of limited American counterforce reprisals than by the threat of total nuclear retaliation; (3) that victory is possible in a superpower nuclear war; (4) that a counterforce nuclear strategy can be undertaken without compromising the prospects for vertical and horizontal arms control; and (5) that nuclear deterrence can work forever. 97 references.
- OSTI ID:
- 5489835
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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