Large bilateral reductions in superpower nuclear weapons

Thesis/Dissertation · Tue Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1985

OSTI ID:5395829

Parnell, G S

The plausibility and stability of alternative states of the world with large bilateral reductions in nuclear weapons are examined. The current state, with approximately 50,000 nuclear weapons, is compared with two alternative states with arms control agreements with significant verification provisions. The first, minimum deterrence, reduces each superpower's nuclear weapons to a few hundred each and prohibits strategic defense. The second, zero-nuclear-weapons deterrence, abolishes deployed nuclear weapons, but, the superpowers maintain the capability to assemble and deploy a few hundred nuclear weapons on short notice. Strategic defense is encouraged to decrease the incentive to violate the arms control agreements. A conceptual framework is described that captures the fundamental arms procurement and arms control structure in economic terms. The three states are considered the initial conditions and four analyses are performed: potential attack (either a false alarm, an accidental attack, or an intentional attack) stability, major superpower crisis stability, arms procurement stability (the incentives to procure weapons which, although not in violation of the arms control agreements, may be destabilizing), and arms control stability (the incentives to violate the agreements). The analysis focuses on arms procurement and arms control stability.

• Research Organization: Stanford Univ., CA (USA)
• OSTI ID: 5395829
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290600* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
450200 -- Military Technology
Weaponry
& National Defense-- Nuclear Explosions & Explosives
AGREEMENTS
ARMS CONTROL
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
NATIONAL DEFENSE
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROCUREMENT
VERIFICATION
WEAPONS