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U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

U. S. defense problem as it pertains to battlefield nuclear weapons

Technical Report ·
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/5196450· OSTI ID:5196450
The military forces of the United States, and its NATO Allies have been closely patterned after those forces employed to win the Second World War. U.S. theater policy is strongly oriented away from nuclear weapons and toward dependence upon conventional forces, which in NATO are confronted by an overwhelming Warsaw Pact conventional force, and a potent theater nuclear capability, the use of which is relatively morally unconstrained. The evident consequence is a NATO force which would serve as little more than an ill defined tie to the threat posed by the U.S. strategic force. The high risk associated with such a strategic deterrent, along with the high cost of a conventional force of questionable potential, suggests that other solutions to the NATO defense problem be explored. Such is the purpose of this paper. The possible solution lies with a defensive NATO force dependent upon the warfighting capability of battlefield nuclear weapons and a strategic force operating under a no-first-use strategy. As this force is optimized, it carries an increasing price of social, political, and military change of distressing proportions.
Research Organization:
Los Alamos Scientific Lab., N.Mex. (USA)
DOE Contract Number:
W-7405-ENG-36
OSTI ID:
5196450
Report Number(s):
LA-7173-MS
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English