NATO acquisition strategy: a way to improve readiness and sustainability
In the late 1970s, defense chiefs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became troubled by the shifting balance in conventional-defense capabilities. While the Warsaw Pact has held a quantitative advantage in conventional forces, NATO's qualitative edge, coupled with a flexible response strategy of nuclear escalation, provided the Alliance with a credible deterrent against Warsaw Pact aggression. Strong conventional forces above those needed to conduct a brief forward defense were considered both unnecessary and politically not affordable. Developments in Warsaw Pact strategy and conventional-defense capabilities crystallized the need to strengthen the conventional component of NATO's military deterrence. The continuing Warsaw Pact military buildup in both numbers and quality of conventional and nuclear weapons, matched by NATO's failure to make sufficient responsive investments, had put the Alliance's strategy of deterrence and flexible response in jeopardy. More important, a sustained conventional attack without the use of nuclear weapons was becoming a major element in Soviet strategy.
- Research Organization:
- National Defense Univ., Washington, DC (USA). Mobilization Concepts Development Center
- OSTI ID:
- 7183506
- Report Number(s):
- AD-A-191745/9/XAB
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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AMMUNITION
ASIA
CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
EASTERN EUROPE
EQUIPMENT
EUROPE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
MILITARY STRATEGY
NATO
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
USSR
WARFARE