Evaluating late detection capability against diverse insider adversaries

Conference · Wed Dec 02 23:00:00 EST 1987

OSTI ID:5028064

Sicherman, A

This paper describes a model for evaluating the late (after-the-fact) detection capability of material control and accountability (MCandA) systems against insider theft or diversion of special nuclear material. Potential insider cover-up strategies to defeat activities providing detection (e.g., inventories) are addressed by the model in a tractable manner. For each potential adversary and detection activity, two probabilities are assessed and used to fit the model. The model then computes the probability of detection for activities occurring periodically over time. The model provides insight into MCandA effectiveness and helps identify areas for safeguards improvement. 4 refs., 4 tabs.

• Research Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
• DOE Contract Number: W-7405-ENG-48
• OSTI ID: 5028064
• Report Number(s): UCRL-97740; CONF-8711108-3; ON: DE88008678
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055001* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
CRIME
DETECTION
INFORMATION
INVENTORIES
MANAGEMENT
MATHEMATICS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PROBABILITY
SECURITY
SECURITY VIOLATIONS
STATISTICS
THEFT
VIOLATIONS