Use of fault and decision tree analyses to protect against industrial sabotage
Fault tree and decision tree analyses provide systematic bases for evaluation of safety systems and procedures. Heuristically, this paper shows applications of these methods for industrial sabotage analysis at a reprocessing plant. Fault trees constructed by ''leak path'' analysis for completeness through path inventory. The escape fault tree is readily developed by this method and using the reciprocal character of the trees, the attack fault tree is constructed. After construction, the events on the fault tree are corrected for their nonreciprocal character. The fault trees are algebraically solved and the protection that is afforded is ranked by the number of barriers that must be penetrated. No attempt is made to assess the barrier penetration probabilities or penetration time duration. Event trees are useful for dynamic plant protection analysis through their time-sequencing character. To illustrate their usefulness, a simple attack scenario is devised and event-tree analyzed. Two saboteur success paths and 21 failure paths are found. This example clearly shows the event tree usefulness for concisely presenting the time sequencing of key decision points. However, event trees have the disadvantage of being scenario dependent, therefore requiring a separate event tree for each scenario. (auth)
- Research Organization:
- Science Applications, Inc., Palo Alto, CA
- NSA Number:
- NSA-33-023855
- OSTI ID:
- 4050827
- Journal Information:
- Nucl. Mater. Manage., v. 4, no. 3, pp. 267-276, Journal Name: Nucl. Mater. Manage., v. 4, no. 3, pp. 267-276; ISSN NUMMB
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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