Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

Journal Article · Mon Jul 01 04:00:00 EDT 1996 · JNMM

OSTI ID:372561

Menlove, H O; Abhold, M; Eccleston, G ^[1]; Puckett, J M ^[2]; Ohtani, T; Ohshima, H; Kobayashi, H; Takahashi, S ^[3]

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1. Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)
2. USDOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Washington, DC (United States). International Safeguards Div.
3. Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan)

Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. The robotics used for automation require special containers for nuclear material that cannot be easily removed from the production line. Safety and radiation protection considerations also require that the assay instrumentation be installed in the fuel production lines because, in general, personnel cannot be in the fuel-handling area with nuclear material during operations. Such operational constraints are common in many of the modern facilities that have been designed for fabricating and processing plutonium fuel. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector`s oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector`s workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained from unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA.

• OSTI ID: 372561
• Journal Information: JNMM, Journal Name: JNMM Journal Issue: 4 Vol. 24; ISSN JNMMEK; ISSN 0893-6188
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

05 NUCLEAR FUELS
40 CHEMISTRY
AUTOMATION
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
COINCIDENCE METHODS
DATA ACQUISITION
FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS
JAPAN
NEUTRON DETECTORS
NONDESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PLUTONIUM
RADIOASSAY
SAFEGUARDS