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Title: CSER 97-004: PFP production denitration calciner system

Abstract

The plutonium stabilization program at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) includes conversion of acidic plutonium nitrate solution into plutonium oxide. Conversion is facilitated through use of a vertical calciner installed in Glovebox HC-23OC-2, which is located in RM 230C of this facility. This evaluation supports the Criticality Prevention Specification for the calcining process inside this glovebox. As the product of the calciner is a high density plutonium oxide, a number of limits are required to insure criticality safety. The containers allowed are product receiver vessels and 0.5 C slip lid cans and polyjars. The limits allow for two ``unit masses`` of 2 V total volume each, separated by a distance of at least 25.4 cm (10 in.). This evaluation allows for operation of the calciner for product densities not in excess of 5.5 g Pu/cm{sup 3}.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc., Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
341230
Report Number(s):
HNF-SD-SQA-CSA-529
ON: DE99050233; BR: EW7040000; TRN: 99:004840
DOE Contract Number:
AC06-96RL13200
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 11 Sep 1997
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
42 ENGINEERING NOT INCLUDED IN OTHER CATEGORIES; 05 NUCLEAR FUELS; GLOVEBOXES; CRITICALITY; SAFETY ANALYSIS; PLUTONIUM NITRATES; CALCINATION; PLUTONIUM OXIDES; SCRAP METALS; MATERIALS RECOVERY; RADIOACTIVE WASTE FACILITIES

Citation Formats

Hillesland, K.E. CSER 97-004: PFP production denitration calciner system. United States: N. p., 1997. Web. doi:10.2172/341230.
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Hillesland, K.E. CSER 97-004: PFP production denitration calciner system. United States. doi:10.2172/341230.
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Hillesland, K.E. Thu . "CSER 97-004: PFP production denitration calciner system". United States. doi:10.2172/341230. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/341230.
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@article{osti_341230,
title = {CSER 97-004: PFP production denitration calciner system},
author = {Hillesland, K.E.},
abstractNote = {The plutonium stabilization program at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) includes conversion of acidic plutonium nitrate solution into plutonium oxide. Conversion is facilitated through use of a vertical calciner installed in Glovebox HC-23OC-2, which is located in RM 230C of this facility. This evaluation supports the Criticality Prevention Specification for the calcining process inside this glovebox. As the product of the calciner is a high density plutonium oxide, a number of limits are required to insure criticality safety. The containers allowed are product receiver vessels and 0.5 C slip lid cans and polyjars. The limits allow for two ``unit masses`` of 2 V total volume each, separated by a distance of at least 25.4 cm (10 in.). This evaluation allows for operation of the calciner for product densities not in excess of 5.5 g Pu/cm{sup 3}.},
doi = {10.2172/341230},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Sep 11 00:00:00 EDT 1997},
month = {Thu Sep 11 00:00:00 EDT 1997}
}
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Technical Report:
View Technical Report (3.27 MB)
DOI:  10.2172/341230
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  • The Vertical Denitrating Calciner system will stabilize certain unique solutions containing fissile salts by removing the water and nitrate ion to produce a more easily stored powder. This end is achieved by high-firing the solution in the calciner. The resultant calcine is distinguished by particles which are larger and denser than those produced by the more conventional oxalate precipitation process. This criticality safety evaluation report examines criticality safety for the denitration system, installed in glovebox 188-1 at PFP. The examination shows that, due to the incorporation of standard criticality safety design techniques, the glovebox can be maintained subcritical with minimalmore » reliance on administrative controls. The examination also shows that, ignoring the necessary administrative controls can make a criticality possible in glovebox 188-1. Section 3.0 of this report lists the necessary administrative controls.« less

  • No abstract available.

  • ;
    A criticality safety evaluation report was prepared for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) laboratory denigrating calciner, located in Glovebox 188-1, that converts Pu(NO{sub 3}){sub 4} solutions to the high fired stable oxide PuO{sub 2}. Fissile mass limits and volume limits are set for the glovebox for testing operations and training operators using only nitric acid feed to a plutonium oxide bed in the calciner.

  • As part of the plutonium stabilization operations in the 234-5Z Building, several runs of 26-inch (26 inches of Hg) process vacuum header, along with associated smaller piping is to be cut into sections and disposed of. This criticality safety evaluation report (CSER) requested by Nirider (1996) addresses the removal of several hundred feet of abandoned 3 and 4 inch nominal diameter vacuum header and associated smaller diameter piping runs located in the duct level of the 234-5Z Building in rooms 262, 263, and 264 as shown in the two attached drawings.

  • A nuclear criticality safety analysis has been performed to increase the approved plutonium mass limit for cans stored in Vault {number_sign}4 cubicles at PFP. The original CSER 96-025 accommodated the storage of 4.4 kg of plutonium in PuO, (5.0 kg PuO,) in Vault {number_sign}4 by requiring that half the cubicles be left vacant. This addendum allows for all the cubicles to be used, but with a fissile plutonium mass limit of 58 kg per cubicle. A mass limit for each cubical allows for storage of a larger number of cans if some have less than the 4.4 kg Pu limitmore » per can. The highest k., calculated is 0.932 + 0.003 when an overbatched can is present in every fourth cubicle. This is below the criticality safety limit of kff 0.935, and consequently, an increase of plutonium mass to 4.4 kg per can is within acceptable safety limits for the given mass limit.« less