The criticality incident detection system omission cases for the fuel routes at EDF energy power stations - 14280
- EDF Energy Generation, Barnwood, Gloucester, GL4 3RS (United Kingdom)
Criticality safety cases have been produced to justify the omission of criticality alarms from the fuel routes of EDF Energy's UK power stations. This work has addressed the UK regulator's expectations that adequate criticality warning systems should be provided wherever fissile material is present, unless a safety case shows that no criticality excursion could give any individual a whole body dose exceeding the annual whole body dose limit of 20 mSv, or that the predicted frequency of such excursions is acceptably low. In the UK, EDF Energy operates eight nuclear power stations; one Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and seven Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor stations (AGRs). At these stations, the term 'fuel route' is used to encompass all of the ex-reactor arrangements for the handling and storage of both new fuel and discharged irradiated fuel. These fuel routes were all designed in the 1980's (or earlier), using sound deterministic criticality safety principles, from which it was concluded that criticality alarms were not required in any of these areas. Subsequent changes to UK regulations have resulted in the need for the stations' criticality safety cases to be updated to include formal justifications for the omission of criticality alarms from these fuel routes. The EDF Energy Criticality Incident Detection System (CIDS) omission cases have been produced using the principles originally developed for UKAEA in the early 1960's by Aspinall and Daniels. These principles continue to be regarded as a best-practice approach by UK industry. Modern UK regulations also incorporate the ALARP principle, which requires operators to minimize and balance all of the safety risks from power station operations, so that the risks to both the public and to workers are As Low As is Reasonably Practicable. This paper describes how the work undertaken used the so-called Aspinall and Daniels criteria in conjunction with the requirements of the ALARP principle. The fuel storage pond at the Sizewell B PWR was addressed by dose calculations to show that, from the shielding effects of the concrete structure and the pond water, the potential consequences of a criticality accident could not result in a radiation dose in excess of 20 mSv. All of the other fuel route areas were addressed on the basis that, even if all of the active engineered and administrative criticality controls were to fail, a criticality accident would still not be reasonably expected, i.e. the predicted frequencies of all such excursions are acceptably low. (authors)
- Research Organization:
- American Nuclear Society - ANS, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526 (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 23100820
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: ICNC 2015: 2015 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety, Charlotte, NC (United States), 13-17 Sep 2015; Other Information: Country of input: France; 16 refs.; available on CD Rom from American Nuclear Society - ANS, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526 (US)
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Incorporating realistic conservatism into criticality alarm placement and emergency response: a regulatory perspective - 14425
The application of ICASPA to critical and safe mass calculations - 14586