Coherent-pulse implementations of quantum cryptography protocols resistant to photon-number-splitting attacks

Journal Article · Thu Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 2004 · Physical Review. A

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.69.012309· OSTI ID:20640589

Acin, Antonio; Gisin, Nicolas; Scarani, Valerio ^[1]

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1. Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, 20, rue de l'Ecole-de-Medecine, CH-1211 Geneva 4 (Switzerland)

We propose a class of quantum cryptography protocols that are robust against photon-number-splitting attacks (PNS) in a weak coherent-pulse implementation. We give a quite exhaustive analysis of several eavesdropping attacks on these schemes. The honest parties (Alice and Bob) use present-day technology, in particular an attenuated laser as an approximation of a single-photon source. The idea of the protocols is to exploit the nonorthogonality of quantum states to decrease the information accessible to Eve due to the multiphoton pulses produced by the imperfect source. The distance at which the key distribution becomes insecure due to the PNS attack is significantly increased compared to the existing schemes. We also show that strong-pulse implementations, where a strong pulse is included as a reference, allow for key distribution robust against photon-number-splitting attacks.

• OSTI ID: 20640589
• Journal Information: Physical Review. A, Journal Name: Physical Review. A Journal Issue: 1 Vol. 69; ISSN 1050-2947; ISSN PLRAAN
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

74 ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR PHYSICS
CORRELATIONS
DISTANCE
DISTRIBUTION
ENERGY LEVELS
IMPLEMENTATION
INFORMATION
MULTI-PHOTON PROCESSES
OPTICS
PHOTONS
PULSES
QUANTUM MECHANICS
SECRECY PROTECTION