Robustness of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution against photon-number-splitting attack

Journal Article · Fri Apr 01 04:00:00 EST 2005 · Physical Review. A

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.71.042305· OSTI ID:20653262

Inoue, Kyo; Honjo, Toshimori ^[1]

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1. NTT Basic Research Laboratories, NTT Corporation, 3-1 Morinosato Wakamiya, Atsugi, 243-0198 (Japan)

A photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack against differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is described. In the conventional 1984 Bennett-Brassard protocol, using weak laser light, the PNS attacks, which involve installing a lossless transmission line and blocking pulses from which extra photons cannot be picked up, impose a limit on the transmission distance. In contrast, use of a coherent pulse train in DPS QKD prevents the PNS attack and removes the distance limitation imposed by it. We carried out a DPS QKD experiment that simulated the situation where some pulses are blocked. The result showed that extra bit errors are induced in an eavesdropped condition, indicating the robustness of DPS QKD against PNS attacks.

• OSTI ID: 20653262
• Journal Information: Physical Review. A, Journal Name: Physical Review. A Journal Issue: 4 Vol. 71; ISSN 1050-2947; ISSN PLRAAN
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

74 ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR PHYSICS
CHANNELING
CORRELATIONS
DATA TRANSMISSION
DISTANCE
DISTRIBUTION
ENERGY LEVELS
ERRORS
PHASE SHIFT
PHOTONS
PULSES
QUANTUM MECHANICS
SECRECY PROTECTION
VISIBLE RADIATION