Analyzing Hardware and Software Common Cause Failures in Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using Dual Error Propagation Method
- NCSU
- ncsu
- Idaho National Laboratory
This paper develops a methodology for quantifying software common cause failures (CCFs) in digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. To support the transition of analog I&C systems to digital in nuclear power plants, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are used. The hardware components of the I&C systems have reliability databases that can be used in the PRA studies. However, the failure data for redundant software components of the systems is sparse. Failure of components constitutes a CCF, wherein two or more components or systems fail due to a single shared cause and coupling mechanism. This paper proposes a quantification approach that can simultaneously model hardware and software components, incorporate the CCFs of software systems in the models, and bridge the gap between the failure quantification of models and the development of CCF parametric databases. We demonstrate the dual error propagation method (DEPM) by developing I&C systems failure models for a representative digital reactor trip system. The DEPM models are built to simulate the control and data flows within the systems and can accommodate failure states. By expanding DEPM to software CCFs, we generated alpha factor parameter estimates for each of the modeled error propagation mechanisms.
- Research Organization:
- Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- 58
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC07-05ID14517
- OSTI ID:
- 2004909
- Report Number(s):
- INL/CON-23-71652-Rev000
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: NPIC&HMIT 2023 and PSA 2023 Co-Located Meetings, Knoxville, TN, 07/15/2023 - 07/21/2023
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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