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Targeted modification of hardware trojans

Journal Article · · Journal of Hardware and Systems Security (Online)
 [1];  [2];  [1]
  1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
  2. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)

The use of untrusted design tools, components, and designers, coupled with untrusted device fabrication, introduces the possibility of malicious modifications being made to integrated circuits (ICs) during their design and fabrication. These modifications are known as hardware trojans. The widespread use of commercially purchased 3rd party intellectual property (3PIP) and commercial design tools extends even into trusted design flows. Unfortunately, due to the theoretical result that there is no program that can decide whether any other program will eventually halt, we know that the properties of a program, or circuit, cannot be known in advance of running it. While we can design a circuit to meet some functional specification and generate a simulation or test suite to obtain at least probabilistic confidence that the circuit implements the intended functionality, we cannot test a circuit for unintended functionality due to the combinatorially large state space. To address these concerns, we have developed a design-time method for automatically and systematically modifying portions of a design that exhibit characteristics of hardware trojans. After each modification, the functionality of the design is verified against a comprehensive simulation suite to ensure that the intended circuit functionality has not been changed. This approach can be applied to any digital circuit and does not rely on secret keys or obfuscation.

Research Organization:
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Grant/Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
OSTI ID:
1502452
Alternate ID(s):
OSTI ID: 1502454
Report Number(s):
SAND--2018-12772J; 669721
Journal Information:
Journal of Hardware and Systems Security (Online), Journal Name: Journal of Hardware and Systems Security (Online) Journal Issue: 2 Vol. 3; ISSN 2509-3436
Publisher:
Springer NatureCopyright Statement
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

References (20)

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Scalable Test Generation for Trojan Detection Using Side Channel Analysis journal November 2018
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Towards trojan-free trusted ICs: problem analysis and detection scheme conference January 2008
MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels conference January 2009
FANCI: identification of stealthy malicious logic using boolean functional analysis conference January 2013

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