The Governance of Nuclear Technology

Conference · Mon Sep 22 04:00:00 EDT 2003

OSTI ID:15006453

Vergino, E S; May, M

Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech in 1953 is remembered for engaging the world, and the Soviet Union in particular, in a dialogue about arms control and the formulation of a nuclear regime in which national and international security concerns growing from this unprecedented emerging and frightening new weapons capability would be addressed while tapping the civilian promise of nuclear applications for the good of mankind. Out of it came a series of initiatives, leading fifteen years later to the NPT, intended to allow the growth and spread of the beneficial uses of nuclear know-how while constraining the incentives and capabilities for nuclear weapons. The last 50 years has seen a gradual spread in nations with nuclear weapons, other nations with nuclear knowledge and capabilities, and still others with nuclear weapon intentions. Still most nations of the world have forgone weapon development, most have signed and abided by the NPT, and some that have had programs or even weapons, have turned these capabilities off. Yet despite this experience, and despite a relatively successful record up to a few years ago, there is today a clear and generally recognized crisis in nuclear governance, a crisis that affects the future of all the cross-cutting civilian/security issues we have cited. The crux of this crisis is a lack of consensus among the major powers whose support of international efforts is necessary for effective governance of nuclear activities. The lack of consensus focuses on three challenges: what to do about non-compliance, what to do about non-adherence, and what to do about the possible leakage of nuclear materials and technologies to terrorist groups. Short of regaining consensus on the priority to be given to nuclear material and technology controls, it is unlikely that any international regime to control nuclear materials and technologies, let alone oversee a growth in the nuclear power sector, will be successful in the tough cases where it needs to be successful. Regaining that consensus on the other hand means alleviating some fundamental insecurity on the part of states, and weakening the hold that terrorist groups have on some state governments. This in turn requires that some fundamental issues be addressed, with recognition that these are part of a suite of complex and dynamic interactions. Among these issues are: How will states provide for their own security and other central interests while preventing further proliferation, protecting against the use of nuclear weapons, and yet allowing for the possible expansion of nuclear power?; How best can states with limited resources to fight terrorist activities and safeguard nuclear materials be assisted in securing their materials and technologies?; What is the future role of international inspections? Does the IAEA remain the right organization to carry out these tasks? If not, what are the desired characteristics of a successor agency and can there be agreement on one?; How confident can we be of nonproliferation as latent nuclear weapon capabilities spread? The policies to address these and other issues must explicitly deal with NPT members who do not observe their obligations; NPT non-members; illicit trade in SNM and weapon technologies and the possibility of a regional nuclear war.

• Research Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (US)
• Sponsoring Organization: US Department of Energy (US)
• DOE Contract Number: W-7405-ENG-48
• OSTI ID: 15006453
• Report Number(s): UCRL-CONF-154694
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS
ARMS CONTROL
ATOMS
IAEA
NUCLEAR POWER
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION
SAFEGUARDS
SECURITY
SPEECH
STATE GOVERNMENT
WEAPONS