Shareholder interests and utility competition
Journal Article
·
· Fortnightly
OSTI ID:146074
The process of determining how to implement utility competition is often cast as a struggle between two opposing camps: shareholders and ratepayers. There are, of course, two other major players, management and regulators. The bipolar view tacitly assumes that shareholder and management interests coincide and that regulators have customer interests at heart. Neither assumption is valid. Shareholder interests deviate from management interests in important ways, just as the interests of the entrenched regulatory bureaucracy diverge from the public interest. Therefore, shareholder and management interests must be considered separately. In the past, managements have often pursued their own interests, with devastating financial impact on shareholders. Competition offers shareholders an opportunity to increase their leverage over managements, thereby increasing their returns as well.
- OSTI ID:
- 146074
- Journal Information:
- Fortnightly, Journal Name: Fortnightly Journal Issue: 6 Vol. 133; ISSN FRTNE8
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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