GPS Spoofing Attack Characterization and Detection in Smart Grids
- Lehigh Univ., Bethlehem, PA (United States); University of Arkansas (SEEDS Center)
- Lehigh Univ., Bethlehem, PA (United States)
The problem of global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks on smart grids endowed with phasor measurement units (PMUs) is addressed, taking into account the dynamical behavior of the states of the system. First, it is shown how GPS spoofing introduces a timing synchronization error in the phasor readings recorded by the PMUs and alters the measurement matrix of the dynamical model. Then, a generalized likelihood ratio-based hypotheses testing procedure is devised to detect changes in the measurement matrix when the system is subjected to a spoofing attack. Monte Carlo simulations are performed on the 9-bus, 3-machine test grid to demonstrate the implication of the spoofing attack on dynamic state estimation and to analyze the performance of the proposed hypotheses test.
- Research Organization:
- Lehigh Univ., Bethlehem, PA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE)
- DOE Contract Number:
- OE0000779
- OSTI ID:
- 1341357
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Attack Identification and Correction for PMU GPS Spoofing in Unbalanced Distribution Systems
Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation-Based Approach