Radiological and toxicological analyses of tank 241-AY-102 and tank 241-C-106 ventilation systems
The high heat content solids contained in Tank 241-C-106 are to be removed and transferred to Tank 241-AY-102 by sluicing operations, to be authorized under project W320. While sluicing operations are underway, the state of these tanks will be transformed from unagitated to agitated. This means that the partition fraction which describes the aerosol content of the head space will increase from IE-10 to IE-8 (see WHC-SD-WM-CN062, Rev. 2 for discussion of partition fractions). The head spare will become much more loaded with suspended material. Furthermore, the nature of this suspended material can change significantly: sluicing could bring up radioactive solids which normally would lay under many meters of liquid supernate. It is assumed that the headspace and filter aerosols in Tank 241-AY-102 are a 90/10 liquid/solid split. It is further assumed that the sluicing line, the headspace in Tank 241-C-106, and the filters on Tank 241-C-106 contain aerosols which are a 67/33 liquid/solid split. The bases of these assumptions are discussed in Section 3.0. These waste compositions (referred to as mitigated compositions) were used in Attachments 1 through 4 to calculate survey meter exposure rates per liter of inventory in the various system components. Three accident scenarios are evaluated: a high temperature event which melts or burns the HEPA filters and causes releases from other system components; an overpressure event which crushes and blows out the HEPA filters and causes releases from other system components; and an unfiltered release of tank headspace air. The initiating event for the high temperature release is a fire caused by a heater malfunction inside the exhaust dust or a fire outside the duct. The initiating event for the overpressure event could be a steam bump which over pressurizes the tank and leads to a blowout of the HEPA filters in the ventilation system. The catastrophic destruction of the HEPA filters would release a fraction of the accumulated filter loadings and would lead to an unfiltered pathway from the radioactively contaminated and toxic aerosols in the head space (vapor space) of the tank into the outside environment. The initiator for the unfiltered (continuous) release scenario is wetting of the HEPA filters with an accompanying filter breach or failure of the seals surrounding the filter in the enclosure. No releases from the filters themselves are assumed in this scenario. In the absence of controls, the exhaust system would continue to expel the contaminated head space air into the outside environment in all three of these scenarios.
- Research Organization:
- Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc., Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Washington, DC (United States); USDOE Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC06-96RL13200
- OSTI ID:
- 10148994
- Report Number(s):
- HNF-SD-WM-CN-099-Rev.1; ON: DE99050912; BR: EW3130010; TRN: AHC29927%%269
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: PBD: 11 Aug 1998
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Calculation note: project W-320 primary ventilation air flowrequirements for mitigation of steady state flammable gasconcentrations in the headspaces of tanks 241-C-106 and 241-AY-102
Simulation of Hanford Tank 241-C-106 Waste Release into Tank 241-Y-102