Reputation mechanism: From resolution for truthful online auctions to the model of optimal one-gambler problem
- Los Alamos National Laboratory
In this paper we study reputation mechanisms, and show how the notion of reputation can help us in building truthful online auction mechanisms. From the mechanism design prospective, we derive the conditions on and design a truthful online auction mechanism. Moreover, in the case when some agents may lay or cannot have the real knowledge about the other agents reputations, we derive the resolution of the auction, such that the mechanism is truthful. Consequently, we move forward to the optimal one-gambler/one-seller problem, and explain how that problem is refinement of the previously discussed online auction design in the presence of reputation mechanism. In the setting of the optimal one-gambler problem, we naturally rise and solve the specific question: What is an agent's optimal strategy, in order to maximize his revenue? We would like to stress that our analysis goes beyond the scope, which game theory usually discusses under the notion of reputation. We model one-player games, by introducing a new parameter (reputation), which helps us in predicting the agent's behavior, in real-world situations, such as, behavior of a gambler, real-estate dealer, etc.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC52-06NA25396
- OSTI ID:
- 988315
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-09-02152; LA-UR-09-2152; TRN: US201018%%481
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Random-Approx '01 Meeting ; August 21, 2009 ; Berkeley, CA, USA
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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