Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices

Journal Article · Tue Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 1998 · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1998.1041· OSTI ID:659030

Horan, R D ^[1]; Shortle, J S; Abler, D G ^[2]

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1. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, DC (United States)
2. Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park, PA (United States)

Economic research on environmental policy design has largely been concerned with the merits of emissions-based economic incentives (e.g., emissions charges, emissions reduction subsidies, transferable discharge permits). Ambient-based tax-subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions-based instruments. Expanding especially on Segerson`s seminal article, this article examines the optimal design and budget-balancing properties of ambient tax-subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms` choice sets than prior research.

• OSTI ID: 659030
• Journal Information: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 36, Issue 2; Other Information: PBD: Sep 1998
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING AND POLICY
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
TAXES
POLLUTION ABATEMENT
BUDGETS
TAX CREDITS
POLLUTION CONTROL
LIABILITIES