Design Vulnerability Assessments for Safeguards Sealing Systems
The International Atomic Energy Agency (the "Agency") engages in a rigorous equipment authorization process prior to deploying Safeguards instrumentation, including Safeguards sealing systems, for world-wide use. A positive result from a vulnerability assessment is one of the many requirements that must be met prior to instrumentation deployment. Given the long time period in the Safeguards instrumentation development cycle, the substantial Member State investments made, and the significant Agency staff time required, a negative result for the vulnerability assessment can result in the loss of time, considerable additional expense, or even the failure to deploy an instrument or sealing system at all. First suggested in 1998 by the General Physics Institute in Moscow, an approach that incorporates a design vulnerability assessment minimizes the risk of deployment failure by teaming a public sector vulnerability assessment team with the instrument or sealing system design team in order to identify, at the earliest possible design stage, inherent vulnerabilities. Involving the vulnerability assessors early and often in the design and development process avoids many of the problems inherent in evaluating security vulnerabilities only after the design is finalized. The disadvantages include increased costs and time to deployment. An improved pressure-sensitive adhesive label seal, called the "VOID-3 seal" was developed for the Agency using this design vulnerability assessment process.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 1004509
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA-73744; TRN: US1100687
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Proceedings of the 51st Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, July 11-15, 2010, Baltimore, Maryland
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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