Risk Assessment at the Edge: Applying NERC CIP to Aggregated Grid-Edge Resources

Christensen, Dane; Martin, Maurice; Gantumur, Erdenebat; Mendrick, Brandon

doi:10.1016/j.tej.2019.01.018

Title: Risk Assessment at the Edge: Applying NERC CIP to Aggregated Grid-Edge Resources

Full Record
Other Related Research

Abstract

Distributed energy resources (DERs) promise to deliver benefits for both utilities and consumers by dynamically interoperating utility systems with customer-owned grid-edge technologies. These small energy-consuming devices are increasingly being aggregated for participation in grid markets, planning and operations. A cyber attack penetrating the control system of aggregated DERs could negatively impact the operation of the grid. In the worst case, the power grid could be severely damaged and physical safety compromised. In this paper we analyze cybersecurity risks associated with the aggregation of DERs and develop an approach to mitigating that risk. The approaches to both cyber risk analysis and mitigation were developed during a recent research project that serves as an example of how the approaches could be applied. However, both the risk analysis and mitigation are applicable to the broader domain of all DERs. An important conclusion is that the successful cyber compromise of aggregated DERs could have a significant impact on the bulk power system. This is the case even if each individual DER falls below the threshold of compliance with bulk-grid cybersecurity standards. For this reason, we specifically investigate how National Electricity Reliability Corporation's Critical Infrastructure Protection requirements could flow down to interactions between DER aggregatorsmore »« less

Authors:

^[1]; Martin, Maurice ^[1]; Gantumur, Erdenebat ^[2]; Mendrick, Brandon ^[3]

National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)
Duo Security, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)
ETAS/ESCRYPT Embedded Security, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

Publication Date:: Sat Mar 23 00:00:00 EDT 2019

Research Org.:: National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), Energy Efficiency Office. Building Technologies Office

OSTI Identifier:: 1505076

Alternate Identifier(s):: OSTI ID: 1636923

Report Number(s):: NREL/JA-5500-73026
Journal ID: ISSN 1040-6190

Grant/Contract Number:: AC36-08GO28308

Resource Type:: Accepted Manuscript

Journal Name:: Electricity Journal

Additional Journal Information:: Journal Volume: 32; Journal Issue: 2; Journal ID: ISSN 1040-6190

Publisher:: Elsevier

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION; security; power system security; smart grids; home automation; smart homes; internet of things; aggregated energy assets

Citation Formats


                    Christensen, Dane, Martin, Maurice, Gantumur, Erdenebat, and Mendrick, Brandon. Risk Assessment at the Edge: Applying NERC CIP to Aggregated Grid-Edge Resources.  United States: N. p., 2019. 
Web.  doi:10.1016/j.tej.2019.01.018.

Copy to clipboard


                    Christensen, Dane, Martin, Maurice, Gantumur, Erdenebat, & Mendrick, Brandon. Risk Assessment at the Edge: Applying NERC CIP to Aggregated Grid-Edge Resources.  United States.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2019.01.018

Copy to clipboard


                    Christensen, Dane, Martin, Maurice, Gantumur, Erdenebat, and Mendrick, Brandon. Sat .  
"Risk Assessment at the Edge: Applying NERC CIP to Aggregated Grid-Edge Resources".  United States.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2019.01.018.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1505076.

Copy to clipboard


                    
@article{osti_1505076,

  title        = {Risk Assessment at the Edge: Applying NERC CIP to Aggregated Grid-Edge Resources},

  author       = {Christensen, Dane and Martin, Maurice and Gantumur, Erdenebat and Mendrick, Brandon},

  abstractNote = {Distributed energy resources (DERs) promise to deliver benefits for both utilities and consumers by dynamically interoperating utility systems with customer-owned grid-edge technologies. These small energy-consuming devices are increasingly being aggregated for participation in grid markets, planning and operations. A cyber attack penetrating the control system of aggregated DERs could negatively impact the operation of the grid. In the worst case, the power grid could be severely damaged and physical safety compromised. In this paper we analyze cybersecurity risks associated with the aggregation of DERs and develop an approach to mitigating that risk. The approaches to both cyber risk analysis and mitigation were developed during a recent research project that serves as an example of how the approaches could be applied. However, both the risk analysis and mitigation are applicable to the broader domain of all DERs. An important conclusion is that the successful cyber compromise of aggregated DERs could have a significant impact on the bulk power system. This is the case even if each individual DER falls below the threshold of compliance with bulk-grid cybersecurity standards. For this reason, we specifically investigate how National Electricity Reliability Corporation's Critical Infrastructure Protection requirements could flow down to interactions between DER aggregators and the DERs themselves in order to protect the grid from these bulk-scale cyber attack impacts.},

  doi          = {10.1016/j.tej.2019.01.018},

  journal      = {Electricity Journal},

  number       = 2,

  volume       = 32,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {Sat Mar 23 00:00:00 EDT 2019},

  month        = {Sat Mar 23 00:00:00 EDT 2019}

}

Copy to clipboard

Journal Article:

Free Publicly Available Full Text

Accepted Manuscript (Publisher)

Accepted Manuscript (DOE)

Publisher's Version of Record

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2019.01.018

Other availability

Search WorldCat to find libraries that may hold this journal

Save / Share:

Export Metadata

Save to My Library

Similar Records in DOE PAGES and OSTI.GOV collections:

Cybersecurity Assessments on Emulated DER Communication Networks

Technical Report Onunkwo, Ifeoma ; Wright, Brian J. ; Cordeiro, Patricia G. ; ...

An increasing number of public utility commissions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. The recently updated national standard, IEEE 1547-2018, requires all DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5, or IEEE 1815 communication interface in order to provide local and bulk power system services. Those communication protocols and associated information models will ensure system interoperability for PV and storage systems, but these new utility-to-DER communication networks must be deployed with sufficient cybersecurity to protect the U.S. power system and othermore »« less
https://doi.org/10.2172/1761846

Full Text Available
OT Operational Anomaly Detection (OAD) T&D + DER

Conference Choi, Seong

The growth of utility-scale renewable energy resources, distributed energy resources (DER), and transportation electrification has increased uncertainty and cybersecurity risks in power grids. The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture model which is widely adopted by the utility industry is now insufficient to protect the power grid against cyber-attacks. There is a need to identify what cybersecurity model is effective on Energy Management System (EMS), Advanced Distribution Management System (ADMS), and DER Management System (DERMS) to address the fundamental cybersecurity challenges in the age of increasing renewable energy and DER share as well as consumer participation in the electric energy industry. Themore »« less
Full Text Available
Assessing Cyber-Physical Risks of IoT-Based Energy Devices in Grid Operations

Journal Article Cardenas, D. Jonathan Sebastian ; Hahn, Adam ; Liu, Chen-Ching - IEEE Access

The growing number of consumer-grade network-enabled Distributed Energy Resources (DER) installations introduces new attack vectors that could impact grid operations through coordinated attacks. This work presents a cyber-physical model and risk assessment methodology for analyzing the emerging nexus between Internet of Things-based energy devices and the bulk transmission grid. The cyber model replicates the device-level interconnectivity and software components interaction found within these architectures to understand the feasibly of coordinated attacks, while the physical model is used to assess the attack’s impacts on the grid. The manuscript questions the validity of previous papers’ claims regarding IoT-based grid attacks by addressingmore »« less
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2983313
Requirements and Recommendations for a Physical Attack Characterization Framework

Technical Report McGrath, Jenna K. ; Scott, Heather R. ; Slone, Llewelyn R.

This study seeks to identify existing frameworks or develop requirements and recommendations for a new framework that can consistently characterize physical attacks, analogous to MITRE ATT&CK®. MITRE ATT&CK is widely used across government, research organizations, and the cyber security community to characterize cyber attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a consistent and commonly understood manner. While physical attack taxonomies, methodologies, and other tools for evaluating physical security do exist, many are sector and/or facility-type specific—and therefore not able to provide comparable scenarios across sectors—or are more focused on security assessment instead of the characterization of attacks themselves. A MITREmore »« less
https://doi.org/10.2172/2229613

Full Text Available
Securing Vehicle Charging Infrastructure APR

Technical Report Johnson, Jay Tillay

Cybersecurity is essential for interoperable power systems and transportation infrastructure in the US. As the US transitions to transportation electrification, cyber attacks on vehicle charging could impact nearly all US critical infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as more charging stations communicate to a range of entities (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, etc.), as shown in Figure I.1.1.1. The research challenges are extensive and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) cybersecurity is a major risk to electric vehicle (EV) adoption because the political, social,more »« less
https://doi.org/10.2172/1572920

Full Text Available

Similar Records