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This content will become publicly available on August 18, 2018

Title: Cyber-Physical Attacks With Control Objectives

This study studies attackers with control objectives against cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The goal of the attacker is to counteract the CPS's controller and move the system to a target state while evading detection. We formulate a cost function that reflects the attacker's goals, and, using dynamic programming, we show that the optimal attack strategy reduces to a linear feedback of the attacker's state estimate. By changing the parameters of the cost function, we show how an attacker can design optimal attacks to balance the control objective and the detection avoidance objective. In conclusion, we provide a numerical illustration based on a remotely controlled helicopter under attack.
ORCiD logo [1] ; ORCiD logo [1] ; ORCiD logo [1]
  1. Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, PA (United States). Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Publication Date:
Grant/Contract Number:
OE0000779; DARPA FA8750-12-2-0291
Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 63; Journal Issue: 5; Journal ID: ISSN 0018-9286
Research Org:
Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, PA (United States)
Sponsoring Org:
USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE); Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) (United States)
Country of Publication:
United States
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING; attack detection; cyber-physical systems (CPSs); optimal control; security
OSTI Identifier: