An integrated approach for determining plutonium mass in spent fuel assemblies with nondestructive assay
- Los Alamos National Laboratory
There are a variety of reasons for quantifying plutonium (Pu) in spent fuel. Below, five motivations are listed: (1) To verify the Pu content of spent fuel without depending on unverified information from the facility, as requested by the IAEA ('independent verification'). New spent fuel measurement techniques have the potential to allow the IAEA to recover continuity of knowledge and to better detect diversion. (2) To assure regulators that all of the nuclear material of interest leaving a nuclear facility actually arrives at another nuclear facility ('shipper/receiver'). Given the large stockpile of nuclear fuel at reactor sites around the world, it is clear that in the coming decades, spent fuel will need to be moved to either reprocessing facilities or storage sites. Safeguarding this transportation is of significant interest. (3) To quantify the Pu in spent fuel that is not considered 'self-protecting.' Fuel is considered self-protecting by some regulatory bodies when the dose that the fuel emits is above a given level. If the fuel is not self-protecting, then the Pu content of the fuel needs to be determined and the Pu mass recorded in the facility's accounting system. This subject area is of particular interest to facilities that have research-reactor spent fuel or old light-water reactor (LWR) fuel. It is also of interest to regulators considering changing the level at which fuel is considered self-protecting. (4) To determine the input accountability value at an electrochemical processing facility. It is not expected that an electrochemical reprocessing facility will have an input accountability tank, as is typical in an aqueous reprocessing facility. As such, one possible means of determining the input accountability value is to measure the Pu content in the spent fuel that arrives at the facility. (5) To fully understand the composition of the fuel in order to efficiently and safely pack spent fuel into a long-term repository. The NDA of spent fuel can be part of a system that cost-effectively meets the burnup credit needs of a repository. Behind each of these reasons is a regulatory structure with MC&A requirements. In the case of the IAEA, the accountable quantity is elemental plutonium. The material in spent fuel (fissile isotopes, fission products, etc.) emits signatures that provide information about the content and history of the fuel. A variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques are available to quantify these signatures. The effort presented in this paper is investigation of the capabilities of 12 NDA techniques. For these 12, none is conceptually capable of independently determining the Pu content in a spent fuel assembly while at the same time being able to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of rods. For this reason the authors are investigating the capability of 12 NDA techniques with the end goal of integrating a few techniques together into a system that is capable of measuring Pu mass in an assembly. The work described here is the beginning of what is anticipated to be a five year effort: (1) two years of modeling to select the best technologies, (2) one year fabricating instruments and (3) two years measuring spent fuel. This paper describes the first two years of this work. In order to cost effectively and robustly model the performance of the 12 NDA techniques, an 'assembly library' was created. The library contains the following: (a) A diverse range of PWR spent fuel assemblies (burnup, enrichment, cooling time) similar to that which exists in spent pools today and in the future. (b) Diversion scenarios that capture a range of possible rod removal options. (c) The spatial and isotopic detail needed to accurately quantify the capability of all the NDA techniques so as to enable integration. It is our intention to make this library available to other researchers in the field for inter-comparison purposes. The performance of each instrument will be quantified for the full assembly library for measurements in three different media: air, water and borated water. The 12 NDA techniques being researched are the following: Delayed Gamma, Delayed Neutrons, Differential Die-Away, Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer, Neutron Multiplicity, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence, Passive Prompt Gamma, Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity, Self-integration Neutron Resonance Densitometry, Total Neutron (Gross Neutron), X-Ray Fluorescence, {sup 252}Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron Detection.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC52-06NA25396
- OSTI ID:
- 989777
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-09-03407; LA-UR-09-3407; TRN: US1007135
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Advancements in Nuclear Instrumentation Mearsurement Methods and Their/ ; June 7, 2009 ; Marseilles, France
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Determining Plutonium Mass in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay Techniques -- Preliminary Modeling Results Emphasizing Integration among Techniques
Quantifying the passive gamma signal from spent nuclear fuel in support of determining the plutonium content in spent nuclear fuel with nondestructive assay
Related Subjects
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
BURNUP
COOLING TIME
DELAYED NEUTRONS
DETECTION
FISSION PRODUCTS
FLUORESCENCE
IAEA
NEUTRONS
NUCLEAR FUELS
PLUTONIUM
PROCESSING
PROMPT NEUTRONS
REACTOR SITES
REMOVAL
REPROCESSING
RESONANCE
RESONANCE FLUORESCENCE
SLOWING-DOWN
SPENT FUELS
STOCKPILES
STORAGE
VERIFICATION