Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

Conference · Sat Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 2005

OSTI ID:977971

Johnston, R G ^[1]; Warner, Jon S; Garcia, A R. E. ^[2]; Martinez, R K ^[3]; Lopez, L N ^[4]; Pacheco, A N ^[5]; Trujillo, S J ^[6]; Herrera, A M ^[7]; Bitzer, III, E G ^[8]

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1. Roger G.
2. Anthony R. E.
3. Ronald K.
4. Leon N.
5. Adam N.
6. Sonia J.
7. Alicia M.
8. Edward G.

There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

• Research Organization: Los Alamos National Laboratory
• Sponsoring Organization: DOE
• OSTI ID: 977971
• Report Number(s): LA-UR-05-3658
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
DETECTION
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
LANL
MONITORING
RECOMMENDATIONS
SAFEGUARDS
SECURITY
TRANSPORT
VULNERABILITY
WASTE MANAGEMENT