The future of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Following the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia and later reinforced by revelations about North Korean and Iraqi nuclear activities, there has been growing concern about increasing proliferation dangers. At the same time, the prospects of radiological/nuclear terrorism are seen to be rising - since 9/11, concern over a proliferation/terrorism nexus has never been higher. In the face of this growing danger, there are urgent calls for stronger measures to strengthen the current international nuclear nonproliferation regime, including recommendations to place civilian processing of weapon-useable material under multinational control. As well, there are calls for entirely new tools, including military options. As proliferation and terrorism concerns grow, the regime is under pressure and there is a temptation to consider fundamental changes to the regime. In this context, this paper will address the following: Do we need to change the regime centered on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)? What improvements could ensure it will be the foundation for the proliferation resistance and physical protection needed if nuclear power grows? What will make it a viable centerpiece of future nonproliferation and counterterrorism approaches?
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Laboratory
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE
- OSTI ID:
- 977883
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-04-6908
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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