INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Removal of Categories I and II Special Nuclear Material from Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico"

Technical Report · Fri Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2010

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/972814· OSTI ID:972814

The Department of Energy's (DOE's) Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico (Sandia) develops science-based technologies in support of national security in areas such as nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, military technologies, and homeland security. Sandia's primary mission is ensuring that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable and can fully support the Nation's deterrence policy. Part of this mission includes systems engineering of nuclear weapons; research, design, and development of non-nuclear components; manufacturing of non-nuclear weapons components; the provision of safety, security, and reliability assessments of stockpile weapons; and the conduct of high-explosives research and development and environmental testing. Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, operates Sandia for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). On May 7, 2004, the Secretary announced that the Department would evaluate missions at DOE sites to consolidate Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in the most secure environments possible. The Administrator of the NNSA said that this effort was a key part of an overall plan to transform the nuclear weapons complex into a smaller, safer, more secure, and more efficient national security enterprise. In February 2008, Sandia was the first site to report it had reduced its on-site inventory of nuclear material below 'Categories I and II' levels, which require the highest level of security to protect material such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The Office of Inspector General initiated an inspection to determine if Sandia made appropriate adjustments to its security posture in response to the removal of the Categories I and II SNM. We found that Sandia adjusted its security posture in response to the removal of Categories I and II SNM. For example, security posts were closed; unneeded protective force weapons and equipment were excessed from the site; and, Sandia's Site Safeguards and Security Plan was modified. We also found that some highly enriched uranium in a complex material configuration was not removed from Sandia. This material was designated as Category III material using a methodology for assessing the attractiveness of complex materials that was not specifically addressed in any current DOE directive. Although DOE and NNSA officials believed that this designation was appropriate, the methodology used to support this designation had not, as of the time of our review, been incorporated into the DOE directives system. Historically, the Department has considered the categorization of SNM to be an important national security and public policy issue. Consequently, we believe that expedited action should be taken to formalize this methodology in the DOE directives system and that it be disseminated throughout the Department of Energy complex.

• Research Organization: DOEIG (USDOE Office of the Inspector General (IG) (United States))
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE
• OSTI ID: 972814
• Report Number(s): DOE/IG-0833; TRN: US201006%%696
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING
POLICY AND ECONOMY
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
CHEMICAL EXPLOSIVES
CONFIGURATION
DESIGN
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
MANUFACTURING
NATIONAL SECURITY
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PLUTONIUM
PROLIFERATION
PUBLIC POLICY
RELIABILITY
REMOVAL
SAFEGUARDS
SAFETY
SECURITY
STOCKPILES
TESTING
WEAPONS