Evaluation of MC&A Effectiveness and Its Contribution to the Safeguarding Of Nuclear Material with Assurance Assessments
Safeguards and Security within the DOE complex has struggled with integrating MC&A and Physical Security together in a single model. Attempts were made to incorporate MC&A elements that provide detection into vulnerability assessments. While this approach has met with some success, it does not fully address the different contributions that each make to nuclear material protection. Protection measures that rely on the lack of alarms to imply all nuclear material is still present, in the correct location, and intended use are limited due to their passive nature. A highly effective system may provide confidence that all nuclear material is still present, but it does not provide assurance that it is there. MC&A, through active measures that confirm or verify the actual presence of nuclear material, provides assurance that all of the nuclear material is controlled and accounted for. This paper presents a model that combines the detection and assessment functions from vulnerability assessments with assurance activities provided by MC&A to provide an integrated model that can be used for evaluation of current systems, evaluation of system changes, and monitoring assurance in real time based upon operational activities. 1.0 OVERVIEW Material control and accounting (MC&A) and physical security provide complementary measures that can effectively protect nuclear material against the threats of theft, diversion, and sabotage. Tools have been introduced to evaluate and quantify the effectiveness of different protective measures and schemes, but the ability to fully model the contribution of MC&A to protection effectiveness has been limited. This is due, in part, by not fully recognizing that the two areas contribute differently, but not independently, to protection effectiveness. Physical protection provides detection, assessment, interruption, neutralization, and deterrence against a threat. Except for deterrence, mathematical models have been developed to quantify the contributions of the other elements to obtain an effectiveness value. MC&A helps contribute to this model by providing some detection capabilities and providing assessment under some circumstances to ensure all of the nuclear material is still present as documented. A strong program provides great confidence that nuclear material remains in the location and amounts documented in the nuclear material accounting system. Physical protection is not perfect, however, necessitating MC&A contribution.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 961691
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA-56108; TRN: US0904294
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 48th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), 334-443
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Water Security Toolkit User Manual Version 1.2.
Evaluating the contributions of material control to insider protection