Why we have to keep the bomb
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab, CA (United States)
The United States holds contradictory policies which are on a collision course. While it repeatedly commits to the goal of total nuclear disarmament, it depends on nuclear deterrence for security. In the past, US policymakers have avoided rectifying the contradiction by labeling disarmament as a long-term goal. However, this is increasingly unacceptable to non-nuclear weapon states, who rightly observe that the US is not seriously willing to undertake total nuclear disarmament as its part of the bargain under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Some states are so disgruntled that they propose linking their continued commitment to nonproliferation to setting a timetable for nuclear weapons states to dismantle their arsenals. Linking the extension of the NPT with a requirement for a timetable for nuclear disarmament is not constructive. Disarmament will not eliminate the risk of nuclear war, it will do little or nothing to prevent nuclear proliferation, and it will not cement the end of the Cold War. It will fulfill the Article VI NPT obligation and superficially end discrimination inherent in that treaty - but at a very high price. Because there is now no effective verification for nuclear disarmament, potential proliferants might be inspired to pursue nuclear weapons, and those nations that already have them might decide to secretly retain them.
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- OSTI ID:
- 95945
- Journal Information:
- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Journal Name: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Journal Issue: 1 Vol. 51; ISSN BASIAP; ISSN 0096-5243
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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