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Title: Development of a nuclear fuel cycle transparency framework.

Conference ·
OSTI ID:950892

Nuclear fuel cycle transparency can be defined as a confidence building approach among political entities to ensure civilian nuclear facilities are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. Transparency concepts facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology, as the current international political climate indicates a need for increased methods of assuring non-proliferation. This research develops a system which will augment current non-proliferation assessment activities undertaken by U.S. and international regulatory agencies. It will support the export of nuclear technologies, as well as the design and construction of Gen. IV energy systems. Additionally, the framework developed by this research will provide feedback to cooperating parties, thus ensuring full transparency of a nuclear fuel cycle. As fuel handling activities become increasingly automated, proliferation or diversion potential of nuclear material still needs to be assessed. However, with increased automation, there exists a vast amount of process data to be monitored. By designing a system that monitors process data continuously, and compares this data to declared process information and plant designs, a faster and more efficient assessment of proliferation risk can be made. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the transparency framework that has been developed. As shown in the figure, real-time process data is collected at the fuel cycle facility; a reactor, a fabrication plant, or a recycle facility, etc. Data is sent to the monitoring organization and is assessed for proliferation risk. Analysis and recommendations are made to cooperating parties, and feedback is provided to the facility. The analysis of proliferation risk is based on the following factors: (1) Material attractiveness: the quantification of factors relevant to the proliferation risk of a certain material (e.g., highly enriched Pu-239 is more attractive than that of lower enrichment) (2) The static (baseline) risk: the quantification of risk factors regarding the expected value of proliferation risk under normal (not proliferating) operations. (3) The dynamic (changing) risk: the quantification of risk factors regarding the observed value of proliferation risk, based on monitor signals from facility operations. This framework could be implemented at facilities which have been exported (for instance, to third world countries), or facilities located in sensitive countries. Sandia National Laboratories is currently working with the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) to implement a demonstration of nuclear fuel cycle transparency technology at the Fuel Handling Training Model designed for the Monju Fast Reactor at the International Cooperation and Development Training Center in Japan. This technology has broad applications, both in the U.S. and abroad. Following the demonstration, we expect to begin further testing of the technology at an Enrichment Facility, a Fast Reactor, and at a Recycle Facility.

Research Organization:
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Albuquerque, NM, and Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
OSTI ID:
950892
Report Number(s):
SAND2005-2282C; TRN: US0902087
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting held June 5-9, 2005 in San Diego, CA.
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English